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ABSTRACT
It is a widely accepted fact that state–sponsored Twitter ac-
counts operated during the 2016 US presidential election,
spreading millions of tweets with misinformation and in-
flammatory political content. Whether these social media
campaigns of the so–called “troll” accounts were able to ma-
nipulate public opinion is still in question. Here, we aim to
quantify the influence of troll accounts on Twitter by ana-
lyzing 152.5 million tweets from 9.9 million users, including
822 troll accounts. The data collected during the US election
campaign, contain original troll tweets. From these data, we
constructed a very large interaction graph; a directed graph
of 9.3 million nodes and 169.9 million edges. Recently, Twit-
ter released datasets on the misinformation campaigns of
8,275 state–sponsored accounts linked to Russia, Iran and
Venezuela. These data serve as a ground–truth identifier of
troll users in our dataset. Using graph analysis techniques
along with a game–theoretic centrality measure, we quan-
tify the influence of all Twitter accounts (authentic users
and trolls) on the overall information exchange as is defined
by the retweet cascades. Then, we provide a global influence
ranking of all Twitter accounts and we find that only four
troll accounts appear in the top-1000 and only one in the
top-100. This along with other findings presents evidence
that the authentic users were the driving force of virality
and influence in the network.
KEYWORDS
Disinformation, information diffusion, Twitter trolls, social
media
1 INTRODUCTION
The Russian efforts to manipulate the outcome of the 2016
US presidential election were unprecedented in terms of the
size and scope of the operation. Millions of posts across mul-
tiple social media platforms gave rise to hundreds of mil-
lions of impressions targeting specific segments of the pop-
ulation in an effort to mobilize, suppress, or shift votes [10].
Trolls were particularly focused on the promotion of iden-
tity narratives [11], though that does not distinguish them
frommany other actors during the election [22]. The Special
Counsel’s report described this interference as "sweeping
and systematic" ([17], vol 1, 1). Russia demonstrated an im-
pressive array of tactics to inflict significant damage to the
integrity of the communication spaces where Americans be-
came informed and discussed their political choices during
the election [14].
While Russia’s efforts continue "unabated" [27], it is likely
they and others will seek to target the American election
in 2020 as well as to continue to target elections in Europe
and elsewhere. It is important therefore, to characterize the
operational tactics and impact of social media influence op-
erations if we are to promulgate adequate defenses against
them in the future.
There is considerable debate as towhether state–sponsored
disinformation campaigns that operated on socialmediawere
able to affect the outcome of the 2016 US Presidential elec-
tion.While there is a large body ofwork that tried to address
this question from distinct disciplinary angles [4, 10, 22], a
conclusive result is still missing. There are several obstacles
that any empirical study on this subject has dealt with: (i)
the lack of complete and unbiased Twitter data – the Twit-
ter API returns only a small sample of the users’ daily ac-
tivity; (ii) Tweets from deactivated profiles are not avail-
able; (iii) The followers and followees lists are not always
accessible, hence the social graph is unknown. Moreover,
the disinformation strategies that the operators of the state–
sponsored accounts had employed are vaguely specified. A
study of Russian social media activity has found that the ma-
jority of the communications are not obviously false [20].
It is equally possible that the operators had employed ad-
vanced manipulation techniques such as first building a re-
liable social profile, aiming to engage a group of followers.
Subsequently, they transmitted factually correct, but other-
wise deceptive andmanipulative claims, advancing the polit-
ical objectives of the disinformation campaign. Hence, text
mining andmachine learning techniques for veracity assess-
ment might not perform well under this scenario.
In this paper we measure the impact of troll activities on
the virality of the ambiguous political information that had
been shared on Twitter during the 2016 US Presidential elec-
tion. We consider as “troll” any account that deliberately
spreads disinformation, tries to inflict conflict or causes ex-
treme emotional reactions. A troll account could be human
or operate automatically. An automated operated account is
called “bot”and is controlled by an algorithm that autonomously
performs actions on Twitter. The term “bot” is not synony-
mous to “troll” as benign bots do operate and have positive
impact on users1. In fact, Twitter has set specific rules for
acceptable automated behavior2.
To assess the influence of trolls, we constructed a very
large directed graph from the interactions between the users
(tweet replies and mentions). The graph consists of 9.3 mil-
lion nodes and 169million edges andwe constructed it based
on two Twitter datasets: (i) A collection of 152.5 million
tweets that was downloaded using the Twitter API during
the US presidential election period (from September 21 to
November 7, 2016). Hence, we have access to original troll
tweets that have yet to be deleted by Twitter. (ii) A collec-
tion of original troll tweets which have been released by
Twitter itself as part of the investigation on foreign inter-
ference in the 2016 US election – the misinformation cam-
paigns of 8,275 state–sponsored accounts linked to Russia,
Iran and Venezuela states. Using graph analysis techniques
and Shapley–Value–based centrality – a game theoretic cen-
trality measure – we are able to identify the group of users
that were most probably the driving force of the viral cas-
cades.
We address the following Research Questions (RQ):
RQ1: Who are the most influential authentic and troll
users and can we rank them in order of contribution (im-
pact) to the overall diffusion of information?
RQ2:Which are the viral retweet cascades of web andme-
dia URLs posted or retweeted by authentic users and specific
troll accounts?
RQ3:What is the proximity of top-k influential authentic
users from bot accounts?
Contributions:Our primary contributions are as follows:
• We construct one of the largest graphs representing the
interactions between state–sponsored troll accounts and
authentic users in Twitter during the period of 2016 US
Presidential election. This is an approximation of the orig-
inal followers–followees social graph.
1https://blog.mozilla.org/internetcitizen/2018/01/19/10-twitter-bots-
actually-make-internet-better-place/
2https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-automation
• We introduce the notion of flow graphs – a natural rep-
resentation of information diffusion that takes place in
Twitter platform during the retweet process. This simple
formulation allows us to apply a game-theoretic central-
ity for a fair estimation of users’ contribution on the in-
formation shared without requiring assumptions on the
user behavior. Moreover, we estimate the retweet cascade
trees where we measure how viral they are by the struc-
tural virality, and the influence each user has on the cas-
cade tree by the influence–degree.
• By answering the research questions, we present strong
evidence that troll activity was not the main cause of vi-
ral cascades of web and media URLs in Twitter. Our mea-
surements show that the authentic users were in general
the most active and influential part of the population and
their activity was the driving force of the viral cascades.
At the same time, we find that on average, troll accounts
were tens of timesmore influential than authentic accounts.
These findings further substantiate previously reported
insights [26, 29, 30] and unveil new influence characteris-
tics.
Data availability:Our datasetwill becomepublicly avail-
able under proper restrictions for compliancewith Twitter’s
ToS and the GDPR. The ground truth dataset is provided by
Twitter3.
2 RELATEDWORK
In a seminal work on the general problem of disinforma-
tion on Twitter [26], the authors investigated the diffusion
cascades of true and false rumors disseminated from 2006
to 2017; approximately 126,000 rumor cascades which have
been spread by 3 million people. The rumors had been veri-
fied as true or false by six fact–checking organizations. The
main finding of this study is that false news diffused faster
and more broadly than the true ones and that human behav-
ior contributes more to the spread of falsity than the trolls.
These are in line with our main result that the authentic
users had the dominant role on the viral cascades. Moreover,
part of our methodology has been inspired by this work.We
estimate the true retweet trees following the same method-
ology but we then apply the structural virality method for
the identification of viral cascades. Since our main goal is
to quantify the impact of users on the overall information
exchange, we do not classify the tweets’ content as fake and
non fake rumors. We use the URLs that spread through troll
tweets to serve as “anchors” of retweet cascades that contain
the same piece of information with the troll tweets.
In [5] a large-scale dataset is examined – 171million tweets
by 11 million users – collected during five months prior to
the 2016 US presidential election. From this collection, the
3https://about.twitter.com/en_us/values/elections-integrity.html
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authors analyzed 30 million tweets shared by 2.3 million
users that contained at least one web–URL linking to a news
outlet website. 25% of these news were either fake or bi-
ased representing the spreading of misinformation on Twit-
ter. Then, in order to investigate the flow of information, the
authors constructed retweet networks for each news cate-
gory (based on URLs appeared in the tweet text) where the
direction of edges indicates the flow of information. Fur-
thermore, they estimate the most influential spreaders in
the retweet network using the Collective Influence (CI) al-
gorithm [16] which identifies the minimal set of users who
are more likely to spread the information to the whole net-
work (also see the influence maximization problem in [12]).
One of their findings is that the Trump supporters were the
main group of users that spread fake news although it was
not the dominant one in the whole network. We note that
in [5], the overall retweet graph is constructed directly by
the data as they were provided by the Twitter API. In our
study, we enrich the raw Twitter data by considering all the
possible information paths and at the same time we provide
an estimation of the true retweet trees. Moreover, we treat
every retweet cascade independently, providing an estima-
tion of users’ influence as well as the users’ contribution on
the information exchange.
Grinberg et al. [9] investigates the extent towhichTwitter
users were exposed to fake news during the 2016 US pres-
idential election. Their data consists of tweets from 16.4K
Twitter accounts that were active during the 2016 US elec-
tion season along with their list of followers. They restrict
their analysis on tweets containing a URL from a web site
outside the Twitter. Moreover, the authors introduce the no-
tion of users’ “exposures”, i.e., tweets from a user to his fol-
lowers. This approach is roughly in line with the flow graphs
that are presented in section 4.3. Finally, they investigate
the group of users that have been exposed in certain URLs
as well as the users who have spread URLs from fake news
sources. The findings suggest that although a large part of
the users had been exposed to fake news, only a small frac-
tion of the population (1%) was responsible for the diffusion
of 80% of the fake news.
In [29, 30] the authors analyzed the characteristics and
strategies of 5.5K Russian and Iranian troll accounts in Twit-
ter and Reddit. Moreover, using Hawkes Processes they com-
pute an overall statistical measure of influence that quanti-
fies the effect these accounts had on social media platforms,
such as Twitter, Reddit, 4chan and Gab. One of their main
results is that even though the troll accounts reach a con-
siderably large number of Twitter users and are effective
on spreading URLs on Twitter. However, their overall effect
on the social platforms is not dominant. Our findings ver-
ify these results and support the fact that some trolls have
above average influence.
In [3] the authors examined the Russian disinformation
campaigns on Twitter in 2016. The analysis was based on
43 million posts shared on Twitter by 5.7 million users and
221 troll accounts (September 16 to November 9, 2016). The
study focused on the characteristics of spreaders, namely the
users that had been exposed and shared content published
by Russian trolls. They constructed the retweet graph using
edges that represent retweet actions. They applied the label
propagation algorithm in order to classify Twitter accounts
as either conservative or liberal. Finally, they used Botometer
(a.k.a. BotOrNot) [7], in order to determine whether spread-
ers and non–spreaders can be labeled as bots. The Botome-
ter is a publicly available platform for estimating whether
existing Twitter accounts have the characteristics of Twit-
ter bots. We also apply this technique in order to examine
whether the top-k most influential users exhibit bot behav-
ior.
Bovet et al. [6] propose a method for inferring the polit-
ical opinions of Twitter users during the 2016 US presiden-
tial election. First, they constructed a directed social graph
based on the actions fromone user to another, namely replies,
mentions, retweets and quotes. We have also used this ap-
proach for graph construction. Then, they monitored the
evolution of three structural graph properties, the Strongly
ConnectedGiant Component,WeaklyConnectedGiant Com-
ponent, and the Corona. Subsequently, they build a labeled
set of tweets where the hashtags reflect political opinions by
which they train a machine learning classifier. This leads to
a classification of the hashtags that reflect political opinions.
3 DATASETS
3.1 Ground–truth Twitter data
Twitter has released a large collection of tweets of the state–
sponsored troll accounts as part of Twitter’s election integrity
efforts4. We requested the unhashed version which consists
of the tweets of Twitter accounts identified as Russian, Ira-
nian and Venezuelan – 25M tweets shared by 8,275 troll ac-
counts. In this study, we leverage only the troll user–IDs
which served as ground–truth identifiers of the troll users
in the tweets collection we present next.
3.2 Our Twitter dataset
Our analysis is based on 152.5M tweets from 9.9Musers. The
tweets were downloaded using the Twitter streaming (1%)
API in the period before and up to the 2016 US presidential
election – from September 21 to November 7, 2016 (47 days;
we did not collect data on 02/10/2016). The tweets’ track
terms were related to political content such as “hillary2016”,
“clinton2016”, “trump2016” and “donaldtrump2016”– namely,
4https://about.twitter.com/en_us/values/elections-integrity.html
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a list of phrases used to determine which Tweets are deliv-
ered by the stream (see5 for more details). The tweets were
collected using a Python script utilizing the Tweepy module.
In addition to the tweet text, user screen name, and user ID,
we also collectedmetadata including the hashtags, the URLs
and mentions that were included in the tweet text, as well
as information on the account creation, user timezone, and
user-supplied location and biographic information. Based
on the ground–truth troll IDs, we identified 35.5K tweets
from 822 troll accounts (see Table 1).
Table 1: Twitter dataset
Authentic Trolls
Unique Twitter accounts 9,939,698 822
Total tweets 152,479,440 35,489
Replies 12,942,628 129
Mentions 172,145,775 33,627
Retweets N/A N/A
Even though the retweet labels (i.e., whether a given tweet
is a retweet and of which original tweet-ID and author–ID)
are missing in the initial dataset, in the next section we ex-
plain how we are still able to identify most of the retweets.
4 METHODOLOGY
4.1 The graph of interactions
We followed a graph–theoretic approach, namely, we map
users to nodes and we also map the interactions between
users to edges. We construct the graph based on the tweets
collection we presented in the previous section – 152.5 mil-
lion tweets collected during 47 days. The actions between
the users are either replies or mentions. Each directed edge
(i, j) corresponds to a tweet–action from user i to user j;
either i had replied to a tweet of j or he had mentioned j
in his tweet, or both. Both are actions from one user to an-
other and represent the social relationship between the two.
In other words, i is a “follower” of j . We leverage this graph
as an approximation of the true follower graph – the actual
social network.
This produces a directedmultigraph of users’ interactions,
i.e. multiple edges are permitted between any pair of nodes,
consisting of 169,921,912 edges, 9,321,061 authentic users
and 821 trolls. Although the number of troll accounts is small,
there are indications that some troll accounts might have
substantial activity that is worth investigating further. For
instance, we have 671K edges that point to 285 troll accounts;
in other words, more than half million users had an interac-
tion with troll accounts.
5https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/filter-realtime/guides/
basic-stream-parameters.html
As we mentioned in Section 3.2, although we did not col-
lect the original retweet labels (the original author of the
tweet that has been retweeted is unknown) this informa-
tion is still contained in the field “mentions” provided by
the Twitter API. Hence the graph already contains the edges
that represent the retweet actions, namely, that a given user
has retweeted a user’s certain tweet.
4.2 Retweet Cascades
When a user retweets, we assume that she agrees with the
context of the root–tweet, i.e., the original tweet that has
been retweeted. For this reason, the analysis of the retweet
cascades, that is the series of retweet actions, is important
for the identification of the viral cascades as well as the in-
fluential users in them.
For these reasons, we have to identify the retweet labels
in our dataset by leveraging the following facts:
(1) The head of a retweet text always has a certain form:
“RT @user screen name”where the “user screen name”
refers to the screen name of the author of the original
tweet.
(2) The field “Entitie” contains the sub–field “mention”,
which includes the full list of the user IDs along with
their screen names for all usersmentioned in the tweet.
Hence, in “mentions” there is always the root–user ID
and screen name.
(3) In addition, the“Entities” field provides the list of URLs
that are embedded in the tweet text; web or media
URL, namely the embedded media material such as
videos and photos.
Based on the previous observations, we consider that a
given tweet is a retweet when:
(1) The tweet text starts with “RT @root screen–name”.
(2) Contains at least one URL.
(3) The tweet text, the root screen–name, the mentions
and the embedded URLs are identical for a series of
tweets that have been posted by at least 100 distinct
users and all the user screen–names are different from
the root screen name. For each of these candidate retweets,
we parse the RT @root screen–name and we match it
with the user screen name and the corresponding user
ID that we have in the field “mentions”.
In conclusion, this process enables us to recover 46.4K
retweet cascades with 19.6M tweets, whichwe present in Ta-
ble 2. In the above process, we reconstruct only the retweet
cascades where the root tweet–text contains at least one
URL. The reason for that is that the URLs have a dual role.
First, they are strong identifiers of the tweet–text equality
by which we reconstruct the retweet labels. Secondly, in
a retweet cascade, it is not only the actual tweet that has
been diffused, but mainly the information it contains. So,
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Figure 1: Toy example of retweet analysis. (a) The raw data provided by TwitterAPI along with the follower graph.
(b) The flow graph shows the full information flow according to Twitter functionality and the follower graph. The
edges present the path of information that appears on the users’ timeline prior to their retweets. For instance, user
c has retweeted on date t2. At the same time user b, whom user c follows, has retweeted on date t1 < t2. Note that
a given retweet contains both the name of the user who retweeted and the name of the root user who posted the
original tweet. Hence, we have an edge from the root to any retweeter because the users have retweeted the root
tweet even if they did not follow the root user. (c) The time-inferred cascade tree is constructed from the flow
graph by making the assumption (see Section 4.3), that each retweeter has been influenced by the friend who just
recently retweeted the original tweet.
Table 2: Retweet cascades with minimum 100 unique
retweeters
Authentic Trolls
Total users 3,633,457 233
Root users 8,192 12
Root tweets 45,986 423
Retweeters 3,630,764 228
Total retweets 19,588,072
Total URLs 43,989
the URLs serve as “anchors” by which we connect distinct
retweet cascades, considering that they are referring to the
same piece of information (see also Section 5.3.1).
In order to verify the accuracy of this approach, we tried
to recollect the tweets that have been identified as retweets
by the previous method. Unfortunately, only 10M tweets out
of 19.6M are still available while the rest have been deleted.
Then, in these 10M tweets, we verified that indeed our map-
ping of retweets to root–user IDs is always correct.
Nevertheless, there were some discrepancies in 9,689 out
of 10M tweets, regarding the mapping of retweets to root–
tweet IDs. There are two cases that our approach is not
able to capture: (i) The root–user could post the same tweet
more than once. In this case, although the tweet text and all
the other information are identical across the retweets, the
root–tweet IDs are different; (ii) A given user might quote
and retweet instead of just retweet. In this case, the quoted
retweet will differ in the text compared to the other retweets
even though the root–tweet IDs are identical.
4.3 Flow graphs & Retweet trees
Generally, the retweet data provided by the Twitter API are
notwell constructed and they do not represent the true retweet
path. As we see in Figure 1(a) the raw data have the shape
of a star tree where all the retweets point to the original
tweet. This is not always the real–world case, since a user
may have retweeted a retweet of a friend.
A widely used method for the reconstruction of the true
retweet path is the time–inferred diffusion process [8, 25,
26]. It is based on the causality assumption that a given user
before retweeting has been influenced by his “friend” who
has recently retweeted the same original tweet. Moreover,
since a user can retweet a tweet more than once, we assume
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that he has been influenced by another user on his first ac-
tion. Hence, the final retweet path (see Figure 1(c)) is con-
structed by the raw data provided by Twitter in conjunc-
tion with the follower graph (Figure 1(a)). Thus, we have
two rather extreme cases, the one is the star tree that we
take from Twitter API where no real diffusion structure is
present, and the other is the cascade tree where a specific
hypothesis has been applied with respect to who was in-
fluenced by whom. The latter emphasizes the most recent
friend whereas the former one always the root user.
In this paper, we introduce the notion of flow graphwhich
represents an intermediate case and consists of the time-
inferred edges that we actually use in order to estimate the
true retweet tree. The flow graph presents the diffusion of
information that has taken place in the Twitter platform –
the direction of all possible influence between the retweet-
ers. Let us consider the toy example in Figure 1. Before con-
structing the retweet tree in Figure 1(c),we first have to iden-
tify all the time-inferred edges from the users that retweeted
in time t to the users who will retweet in t + 1. The edges
direction indicates the information flow on the Twitter plat-
form and is based on the fact that when a user retweets a
given tweet, his action appears on his followers’ timeline.
For instance, when user b retweets the root tweet in t1, he
is transmitting this information to his followers c and d . Fi-
nally, we add an edge from the root user to any of the retweet-
ers because in any given retweet, the author’s screen name
is always visible. In our case, the construction of the flow
graph is a little more complicated since we do not have the
original follower graph but a representation of it, namely,
the graph of interactions, where the edges are time inferred.
So, in a given time ti , a given user i receives information
from the users he had already started following at a certain
time tj < ti .
The flow graph together with the retweet tree are the two
main graph structures we leverage in this paper in order
to evaluate the impact of users in the overall information
exchange. In summary:
Flow graph: We measure the contribution of the users to
the overall diffusion of information by the Shapley Value–
based centrality – a game theoretic centrality measure.
Retweet cascade tree: We measure the influence of the
users on this particular retweet tree by the influence–degree,
and the overall virality of the tree by the structural virality.
In the next sections we present the measures mentioned
here, in detail.
4.4 Shapley Value–based centrality
Towards evaluating the users in terms of the influence/im-
pact they had on the retweet cascades we have to create a
consistent ranking where the top-k users are the most influ-
ential ones. One way to do so, is to use a centrality measure
that fits well in our problem. Here, we apply the Shapley–
Value–based degree centrality [1, 2, 15] one of the game–
theory–inspired methods of identifying influential nodes in
networks [18, 19, 23]. These methods are based on the Shap-
ley Value [21], a division scheme for fair distribution of gains
or costs in each player of a cooperative game. The Shapley
Value of each player in the game is the average weighted
marginal contribution of the player over all possible coali-
tions. Hence, the problem of computing the Shapley Value
in a N player game has in most cases exponential complex-
ity, since the possible coalitions are 2N .
In this paper, we apply the Shapley Value–based degree
centrality introduced by Michalak et al. [1, 15] which is fur-
ther refined in [2]. First, in [1, 15] the authors provide a lin-
ear time algorithm for the exact computation of the Shapley
Value in the following game. Given a directed graphG(V , E),
with V nodes and E edges, the set of players are the nodes
inV and each coalition is a subset ofV . The value of a coali-
tion C is defined by the size of the set f rinдe(C) i.e. the
set that consists of the members of C along with their out–
neighbors. This set represents the sphere of influence of the
coalitionC . Moreover, we define that the value of the empty
coalition is always zero. The exact closed form solution of
the Shapley Value of a node ui is
SV (ui ) =
∑
uj ∈{ui }∪Nout (ui )
1
1 + indegreeG (uj )
. Hence, the al-
gorithm for computing the Shapley Values has running time
O(|V | + |E |) (see Algorithm 1 in [1, 15]). In fact, the Shapley
Value is the sum of probabilities that the node contributes
to each of its neighbors and itself.
This formulation is very similar to what we want to mea-
sure in the flow graphs. In our case, the value of a coalition is
the set of users that have been informed from the members
of the coalition about a given root–tweet. Having said that,
we cannot directly apply the above formulation since a node
cannot inform itself. This very problem has been addressed
by the authors in [2] to solve the influence maximization
problem. They refined the previous formulation so that the
value of a coalitionC is the size of the out–neighbors of the
member inC , i.e. the number of nodes that can be directly in-
fluenced byC . In conclusion, we compute the Shapley Value
for all nodes in any flow graph using the following formula
(see [2] for more details):
SV (ui ) =
∑
uj ∈Nout (ui )
1
1 + indegreeG (uj )
(1)
In this way, the “leaf” nodes have always zero Shapley
Value since they did not inform anyone in the flow graph.
The advantage of this approach is that it provides a linear
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time computation of Shapley Values and also works for dis-
connected graphs. In fact, this is the case that we face here,
since the overall information flow is represented by the flow
graphs i.e. a set of disjoint graphs. Moreover, we can com-
pute the overall Shapley Value for any subset of retweet cas-
cades that a user is part of. As we will show in Section 5.3.1
we use this property in order to evaluate trolls and users to-
gether, only in a subset of retweet cascades. The intuition of
this approach is that Equation 1 computes in a fair way the
users’ contribution in informing the other members of the
graph for a given piece of information, which in our case
is the original root–tweet and the URL it contains. We note
that from the method in [2] we use only the part that com-
putes the Shapley Values and not the whole process (influ-
ence maximization). Our goal is to compute the users’ con-
tribution without assumptions regarding the influence pro-
cess.
Finally, the global Shapley Value of a user in the overall
information exchange is the summation of his Shapley Val-
ues in the flow graphs (FG) he participates in. Hence:
SVдlobal(u) =
∑
FG ∈{FG }u
SV (u, FG) (2)
4.5 Structural virality & influence–degree
Structural virality is a method for evaluating how viral a
retweet cascade tree is [8]. The structural virality of a cas-
cade treeT withn > 1 nodes is the average distance between
all pairs of nodes in a cascade. That is:
ν (T ) =
1
n(n − 1)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
di j (3)
where di j is the shortest path between the nodes i and j .
The ν (T ) represents the average depth of nodes when we
consider all nodes as the root of the cascade.
The structural virality measures how viral a retweet cas-
cade is. We expect that the tree of a viral cascade will have
many sub–trees, which represent many generations of a vi-
ral diffusion process in a smaller scale. On the other hand, a
cascade tree with many leaves, directly connected with the
root, represents a “broadcast” – where in a single diffusion
process the material has been transmitted to many nodes
(see Figure 1(a) an example of a broadcast). Even though the
structural virality is a measure for the cascade tree, it also re-
flects the collective influence of the nodes in the tree, mean-
ing that not only the root but also other intermediate nodes
should have been influential, since the material has been
transmitted in several regions of the network. So, we expect
to find influential nodes in cascades with large structural
virality. Hence, in order to measure the influence on indi-
vidual level, we define the influence–degree. The influence–
degree measures the direct influence a node had on a cas-
cade tree. It is defined as the number of users that have been
influenced by user i in the cascade tree. For instance, in Fig-
ure 1(c) the influence–degree of node a is 2 because he has
influenced both b and e .
The global influence–degree is the total number of users
that have been influenced by i in all the cascade trees that i
has participated in.
5 RESULTS
The analysis is based on the comparison of the influence of
two groups of users: (i) the trolls; (ii) the rest of the users
in the graph. First, we provide general statistics about the
structure of the overall directed multigraph, as well as the
corresponding directed simple graph (where only one edge
is allowed between each pair of nodes). The simple graph is
necessary in order to compute certain topological features
such as the largest connected component and the k–core de-
composition. Next, we focus on the analysis of the retweet
cascades trees and their corresponding flow graphs. We pro-
vide general statistics and we compute the Structural Viral-
ity of each cascade tree along with the nodes’ influence–
degree. Moreover, we compute the nodes’ Shapley Value in
the flow graphs. Finally, we provide global rankings where
we identify the top-k influential users (authentic or troll).
5.1 Graph topology
5.1.1 Degree distribution. Figure 2 presents the empiri-
cal complementary cumulative distribution (CCDF) of the
in–degree and out–degree for each user (authentic or troll)
in the directed multigraph as well as in the directed simple
graph. Both graphs consist of 9,321,061 authentic users and
821 trolls. In the simple graph (or graph, for brevity) only
one edge is allowed for each pair of nodes that is already
connected in the multigraph. Moreover, the multigraph has
been constructed by the users’ actions (replies andmentions)
on other Twitter accounts and posts. Hence, the in–degree
represents the user’s popularity, i.e. the followers that are
interested in the posts (tweets) of the user in question. On
the other hand, the out–degree is a measure of a user’s so-
ciability/extroversion, i.e., how active a given user is by in-
teracting with other Twitter accounts. Furthermore, it is im-
portant to compare the degree distributions in both graphs
(multigraph and graph) because users with a high degree in
the multigraph do not necessarily have a large degree in the
graph. For instance, one might have a large in–degree in the
multigraph only because she is popular to a small group of
people which is highly engaged with her Twitter account;
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Figure 2: Multigraph & simple graph: CCDF of the non–zero in–degree and out–degree of all nodes. Authentic
users are denoted as simply “users” for brevity.
they perform a large number of actions on her tweets while
their population size is not significantly large.
Figure 2(a) & (c) presents the in–degree distributions where
we observe that: (i) 285 trolls and 2.3M authentic users have
non zero in–degree; (ii) the degree distributions for both
graphs are very similar; and (iii) 11 troll accounts out of 285
have in–degree larger than 1K. On the other hand, we have
9.2K and 34 authentic users with in–degree larger than 1K
and 10K, respectively. The top-3 trolls have large in–degrees,
i.e., 38K, 45K and 89K. On the other hand, the top-3 authen-
tic users have in–degrees 385K, 1.1M and 1.8M.
Regarding the out–degree (Figure 2(b) & (d)): (i) 675 trolls
and 8.5M authentic users have non–zero out–degree; (ii) the
troll activity is not substantial, i.e., 33 accounts have out–
degree larger than 100 and the top-3 between 900 to 3.2K;
(iii) the authentic users appear to be quite more active, i.e.,
8.6K accounts have out–degree larger than 1K and 47 be-
tween 5K to 12.6K. In conclusion, it seems that in our dataset
the troll activity is not dominant compared to the activity of
authentic users.
Finally, Table 3 presents the average values for in–degree
and out–degree for trolls and authentic users in both graphs.
Even though the authentic users are the dominant part of
the population, the trolls attracted, on average, considerably
Table 3: Average values: Authentic users vs Trolls
Authentic Trolls
Multigraph
In-degree 18.16 821.22
Out-degree 18.23 38.97
Graph
In–degree 8.99 258.63
Out–degree 9.02 22.48
Largest Comp. Coreness 9.22 31.75
RT Cascades
Shapley Value 3.21 269.02
Infl. Degree 5.35 382.71
Ranking by Shapley 1, 82 · 106 1, 61 · 106
larger amount of traffic (actions by other users on their ac-
counts). For instance, the trolls’ average in–degree is 45 times
higher than the authentic users’ average in–degree.
5.1.2 Connected components. Herewe examine the struc-
ture of the undirected version of the graph by identifying
the connected components. Since we have only a sample of
the total activity, we examine the undirected version of the
graph where all the edges (social relationships) are recipro-
cal.
A connected component is a subgraphwhere for each pair
of nodes i , j there is an undirected path – a graph traverse –
from i to j . Since the subject of this study is the diffusion of
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Figure 3: The connected components of the undirected
version of the graph.
information, the connectivity of a region implies that there
is a possible path for information flow between the nodes
that belong to this region.
The undirected graph consists of 9.3M nodes and 82.8M
reciprocal edges.We identify 104,954 connected components.
Figure 3 presents the number of connected components for
a given component size (i.e., number of nodes in the com-
ponent) in a log–log plot. The largest part of the graph is
well–connected. The largest connected component consists
of 9M nodes and 82,7M edges while the second largest has
only 223 nodes. In other words, we have a giant connected
component along with thousands very small ones.
5.1.3 k–core decomposition. We compute the k–core de-
composition of the nodes in the largest connected compo-
nent. Thek–core decomposition is the process of computing
the cores of a graphG . The k-core is the maximal subgraph
of G where each node has degree at least k . The k–shell is
the subgraph of G that consists of the nodes that belong to
k–core but not to (k + 1)–core. A node has coreness (or core
number) k if it belongs to the k–shell. In other words, each
node is assigned to a shell layer of the graph G . The graph
k–core number is the maximumvalue ofk where thek–core
is not empty. It has been proved that the coreness is one of
the most effective centrality measures for identifying the in-
fluential spreaders in a complex network [13]. Nodes with
larger coreness are more likely to be more central in the
graph.
In Figure 4, we present the empirical complementary cu-
mulative distribution (CCDF) of the coreness values for troll
and user accounts, respectively. The graph k–core number
is 854. The majority of nodes in the larger k–shells are the
users, since their population is larger than that of the troll ac-
counts. There are only eight trolls with large coreness; seven
accounts are part of the largest 854–shell and one account
is part of the second largest 853–shell. This is an indication
that these accounts were probably influential. Regarding the
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Figure 4: CCDF of the coreness for the nodes in the
largest connected component.
authentic users, 3,710 and 250 of them belong to the largest
and second largest k–shell, respectively. Finally, from Ta-
ble 3 we observe that the average coreness of trolls is three
times larger than the coreness of authentic users.
Summary of Results: The graph of interactions is well
connected. Based on the overall graph structure, few trolls
have substantial number of followers (in–degree), activity
on other accounts (out–degree) and structural position in
the network (coreness). Generally, the dominant part of the
population consists of the authentic users. On the other hand,
on average, the trolls attracted tens of times more traffic
than the average user.
5.2 Retweet Cascades
We now turn our attention to the retweet cascades and we
provide general statistics about the popularity of the root
tweets posted by authentic users and trolls.
In Figure 5 we present the CCDF of the number of unique
retweeters and the CCDF of the total number of retweets per
retweet cascade. From the 423 retweet cascades that have
been initiated by troll accounts, 18 of them have more than
1K retweeters. In addition, the two largest cascades have
5.2K and 7.5K retweeters (Figure 5(a)). Regarding the cas-
cades that started by authentic accounts, in 2,890 of them
the number of retweeters is larger than 1K; 101 cascades
have more than 10K retweeters and the top-5 have between
40K to 83.2K. Regarding the number of retweets per cascade,
the findings are similar to the previous ones. Themost popu-
lar root tweets have been posted by authentic users instead
of trolls (Figure 5(b)). Moreover, in the largest four cascades,
the number of retweets is between 83K to 111K, which ren-
ders them considerably larger than the number of unique
retweeters. This indicates that the root tweets of these four
cascades were very popular and they have been retweeted
multiple times by the same users.
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Figure 5: CCDF of retweet cascades in terms of unique number of retweeters and total number of retweets. Au-
thentic users are denoted as “users” for brevity. The retweeters might have retweeted the same tweet more than
once, hence the number of retweets is larger than the number of retweeters.
5.2.1 Structural virality. The previous results depict that
the cascades initiated by trolls were not considerably large.
However, the results are based on the unstructured raw data
provided by Twitter API, where all the retweets point to the
original tweet (see the example in Figure 1(a)). Here, we aim
to measure how viral the cascades were by using the mea-
sure of structural virality (see Section 4.5). For the compu-
tation of Equation 3, we use the networkx6 Python package
(Dijkstra’s algorithm).
In Figure 6 we compare the structural virality of cascade
trees for: (i) the cascades initiated by trolls (423, see Table 2);
and (ii) the 45,986 cascades initiated by other users. We can
see that the users were the source of the most viral cascades.
The top troll cascade has 13.95 structural virality. On the
other hand, 138 user cascades have structural virality larger
than 13.95.
One would expect that cascades with large structural vi-
rality, should also have large number of participants (retweet-
ers). In other words, we should expect a positive correlation
between these two variables. However, this does not seem to
be the case in our dataset. Specifically, in Figure 7we present
the scatter plots of structural virality versus the number of
nodes in the cascade tree. We observe that cascades with
very small virality have a quite large number of users (Fig-
ure 7(a)). This means that the majority of users retweeted
the original tweet and not so often the retweet of another
user. For the cascades that were initiated by troll accounts,
the situation is different (Figure 7(b)). There are cascades
with very large virality and a large number of users (au-
thentic or troll). A possible explanation is that the commu-
nity around the trolls wasmore dense, with users retweeting
each other and forming an “echo chamber” where political
polarization took place.
6https://networkx.github.io/
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Figure 6: Structural Virality of the retweet cascade
trees.
Summary of Results: The vast majority of viral cascades
were initiated by authentic users and very fewwere initiated
by troll accounts.Moreover, retweet cascadeswith thousands
of retweets have very small structural virality, which indi-
cates that the tweet context together with the root user were
very popular and the users directly retweeted the root.
5.3 Top-k influential users
We conclude the analysis by identifying the most influen-
tial Twitter accounts – either trolls or authentic users. We
estimate their influence based on twomeasures, the Shapley
Value–based centrality and the influence–degree. First, we
produce the global ranking of all accounts that are part of
the retweet cascades and then report the rank of the troll ac-
counts and the most influential authentic users. In addition,
we measure how close to a Twitter bot the profiles of the
top-1000 authentic users were. In order to estimate this we
use the Botometer API [24, 28] which has been used in the
literature for identifying Twitter bots [5, 6]. Our goal is to ex-
amine whether the behavior of top ranked accounts deviate
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Figure 7: Scatter plot of structural virality versus number of retweeters for retweet trees which have either trolls
or authentic users as root (the author of the original tweet).
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Figure 8: CCDF of the non-zero Shapley Value for troll and authentic user accounts. For brevity, authentic users
are denoted as “users”.
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Figure 9: Botometer scores CAP(English, universal) for the top-1000 most influential users. Plots for CAP ≥ 0.2
and global ranking based on Shapley Value centrality
from a human operated account. As we mentioned in Sec-
tion 1, an account can be automated (having a high Botome-
ter score) and at the same time can be benign. In otherwords,
being a Twitter bot does not coincide with being a troll. On
the other hand, a high bot–score raises questions about the
authenticity of the account.
Botometer7 classifies Twitter accounts as bot or human
with 0.95 AUC classification performance [24]. It uses vari-
ous machine learning models and more than a thousand fea-
tures which have been extracted from the publicly available
7https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu
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data of the account in question, such as friends, accounts’
profile or language.Whenwe check an account, the Botome-
ter API returns various scores where the more general one
is the Complete Automation Probability (CAP) – the proba-
bility that a given account is completely automated. For a
given account, two CAP scores are provided, one based on
its English language tweets and one for universal features.
For instance, if we know that a user is from China and the
majority of her tweets are written in Chinese, then we can
consider the CAP(universal) score as the estimator of that
account being a bot.
5.3.1 Shapley Value–based centrality. We compare the 233
trolls with the 3.6M users in terms of the impact they have
on the diffusion of information which in our case is the
tweet context. Aswementioned in Section 4.3, for each retweet
cascade there is a corresponding flow graph which formal-
izes the overall information exchange that has taken place
between the users who retweet a given tweet. Here, based
on the flow graphs, we compute the global Shapley Value of
each node (Twitter account) using the Equations 1 and 2. In
addition, having the URLs that are embedded in the tweets
text as identifiers of the text and media material that has
been diffused in the network, we collect the cascades which
refer to those URLs which troll accounts have spread, either
by posting an original root tweet or by retweeting. For sim-
plicity, we call these URLs as URLs–troll.
In Figure 8(a) we plot the CCDF of the global Shapley
Values, i.e., the contribution of each node/account on the
overall diffusion of information. We have 27 out of 235 trolls
and 161,513 out of 3.6 million authentic users with non–zero
Shapley Value. Recall from Section 4.4 that, the “leaf” nodes
of a flow graph always have zero Shapley Value since they
do not transmit the information any further, i.e. their mar-
ginal contribution to any possible coalition is always zero.
In other words, only 27 trolls have an effect on the diffusion
of information that took place by the retweet cascades. Sub-
sequently, based on the global Shapley Values, we get the
global ranking, where the rank for the trolls is [27, 150, 181,
769, 1649, 1797, 2202, 3273, 3964, 4424, 10017, 12263, 12939,
22706, 23858, 38246, 58516, 58524, 64181, 90589, 114414, 124387,
139794, 142181, 146944, 158378, 158960]. Hence, only four
troll accounts are in the top-1000 and one of them in the
top-100 (see Table 5). Moreover, from Table 3 we observe
that the average ranking of trolls is not significantly larger
than the rest of the population. At the same time, the av-
erage Shapley Value (global) for troll accounts is 83 times
larger than the authentic users’ Shapley Value, which indi-
cates that the trolls accounts were quite effective in spread-
ing information.
Finally, in Figure 8(b) we report the Shapley Values only
for the retweet cascades of URLs–troll. We have 2,723 URLs
which appear in 3,924 cascades consisting of 934K authen-
tic users and 233 trolls, in total. The distribution for the
trolls is the same with the global one, since the retweet cas-
cades of URLs–troll are the only ones with troll accounts
present. Regarding the authentic users, we recompute their
total Shapley Value by the Equation 2 and only for the subset
of retweet cascades that correspond toURLs–troll. Again, we
reach a final ranking, where the ranking of trolls in the top-
1000 is [7, 28, 32, 125, 335, 361, 444, 697, 864, 981], namely,
ten trolls appear in the top-1000 and four of them in the top-
100.
How similar to bot accounts are the top-k users? In order
to estimate this, we use the Botometer scores for the top–
1000 users. In top-1000, we identify 243 inactive accounts
where the 24 of them are in the top-100. Althoughwe are un-
able to report the reasons for their inactivity, still, this raises
serious questions about their authenticity and practices. Fig-
ure 9 presents the scatter plots for the active accounts in top-
1000 – the Shapley Values along with the Botometer CAP
scores. For the sake of clarity in presentation, we plot only
the users with CAP ≥ 0.2. Generally, the recommendation
is that a score above 0.5 indicates a bot account (see [6]).
Only 22 and 21 users have CAP(English) and CAP(universal)
larger than 0.2, respectively. Only four users together with
one user have CAP(English) ≥ 0.5 and CAP(universal) ≥
0.5, respectively. This indicates that the larger portion of
users in the top-k do not exhibit bot characteristics.
Lastly, Table 4 shows the account information for the top–
10 influential Twitter users based on the Shapley Value. We
also present the corresponding rankings in terms of influence–
degree and coreness along with the Botometer scores
CAP(Enдlish,universal). We report the accounts informa-
tion (user IDs, users screen–name) only for the active ones.
Two accounts in top-10 are inactive, which raises serious
doubts about the authenticity of these users. The top-10 users
are part of the largest shell (854). Table 5 reports the ac-
count information of trolls in top-1000 alongwith their rank-
ings and coreness. All trolls are part of the largest 854–shell.
Moreover, in retweet cascades initiated by them, more than
1.1% of the total number of retweets were from authentic
users belonging to the top–1000 group.
5.3.2 Influence–degree. Now,we use the influence–degree
as a measure to rank users and trolls according to the ef-
fect they have on the retweets cascade trees. Recall that the
influence–degree of a given node i is the total number of
nodes that have been directly influenced by i , in all cascade
trees that i participates in, either as root of the tree or as
intermediate node (for more details see Section 4.5).
Figure 10 reports the CCDF of non-zero influence values
for users and trolls. In summary,we have 21 trolls and 118,960
users with non–zero influence.We found four troll accounts
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Table 4: Top-10 influential accounts
User ID Screen–name Ranking Ranking Coreness CAP(English) CAP(universal)
by Shapley by Infl. Degree
1339835893 HillaryClinton 1 1 854 0.00148281 0.00193585
347627434 LindaSuhler 2 2 854 0.00682617 0.0185992
25073877 realDonaldTrump 3 4 854 0.00155435 0.00219844
729676086632656900 TeamTrump 4 5 854 0.00141879 0.00186551
16589206 wikileaks 5 6 854 0.00126169 0.00186551
Inactive Inactive 6 13 854 N/A N/A
18643437 PrisonPlanet 7 9 854 0.0011786 0.00201394
1367531 FoxNews 8 7 854 0.00281466 0.00257104
Inactive Inactive 9 11 854 N/A N/A
759251 CNN 10 8 854 0.00313413 0.00272963
Inactive Inactive 11 10 854 N/A N/A
Inactive Inactive 13 3 96 N/A N/A
Table 5: Troll accounts in top–1000
User ID Screen–name Ranking Ranking Coreness # Retweeted
by Shapley Value by Infl. degree by top-1000 Users by top-10 Users
4224729994 TEN_GOP 27 34 854 1098 (1.11%) 17
4272870988 Pamela_Moore13 150 201 854 372 (1.32%) 4
4218156466 America_1st_ 181 241 854 347 (1.34%) 3
3990577513 tpartynews 769 899 854 63 (1.15%) 2
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Figure 10: CCDF of the non-zero Influence–degree for
troll and authentic user accounts.
in the top-1000 with rankings [34, 201, 241, 899] and one of
them in the top-100 (see also Table 5). Finally, from Table 3
we observe that the influence–degree of trolls is more than
70 times larger than the users’ influence, on average; a sim-
ilar result with the one for the Shapley Value.
Summary of Results: Four troll accounts were amongst
the most influential users. Their tweets have been retweeted
tens of times by top–1000 influential authentic users. In gen-
eral, the top-1000 authentic users do not exhibit bot behav-
ior. On the other hand, 24% of the accounts are now inactive
something that raises questions about their authenticity and
practices overall.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have extensively studied the influence that
state–sponsored trolls had during the 2016 US presidential
election by analyzing millions of tweets from that period.
We first constructed the graph of interactions between trolls
and authentic users which represent an approximation of
the true social network and then we concentrate our anal-
ysis on the retweet cascades. Since the data provided by
the Twitter API are not well-structured and all the retweets
point to the original tweet, we estimate the retweet paths
by constructing the retweet cascade trees. In order to mea-
sure the users’ impact on the diffusion of information, we
introduce the notion of flow graph, where we apply a game
theoretic–based centralitymeasure. In addition, wemeasure
the direct influence that users had on the cascade trees. The
results indicate that although the trolls initiated some viral
cascades, their role was not a dominant one and the source
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of influence was mainly the authentic users. At the same
time, the average influence of trolls was roughly 70 times
more than the influence of the authentic users. This indi-
cates that, the strategies these trolls followed in order to at-
tract and engage authentic users were sufficiently effective.
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